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Abstract
Defensive practice has received attention through theMunro review of child protection,
whichhas identified that current organisational cultures increase the likelihoodof defen-
sive practice. Whilst the wider socio-political climate that gives rise to defensive practice
hasbeenexploredwithin the literature, littleattentionhasbeenpaid to theeveryday real-
ities of defensive practice. This paper reports the findings of a study into final year social
work students’ attitudes towards defensive practice within social work. Three focus
groupswerecompletedwitha totalofninety final-year students that collectedqualitative
and quantitative data using interactive software. This paper examines how participants
perceiveddefensive practice, both ingeneral andwhen facedwith real-life vignettes. Par-
ticipants distinguishedbetweenpro-activebehaviour (sinsof commission) andpassivebe-
haviour (sins of omission), generally regarding the latter as less serious because it was less
tangible and easier to attribute to more positive motives. Whilst the literature identifies
defensive practice as deliberate behaviour, the focus group discussions suggest that it is
a subtler and less conscious process. Whilst there was there was a general consensus
about the nature of defensive practice, there was considerable disagreement about spe-
cific vignettes and several competing explanations are explored.
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Introduction and rationale for the study
In the UK, four decades of public inquiries into child-death tragedies have
significantly shaped public perceptions of the social work profession
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(Munro, 2004, 2010; Parton, 2006; Kuijvenhoven and Kortleven, 2010).
Adverse media reporting of social work became increasingly apparent
since the 1980s, following a number of high-profile child-death inquiries
(Ayre, 2001; Cooper et al., 2003). The social work profession has attracted
considerable media criticism, often directed at vilifying individual workers
andmanagers (Ayre, 2001; Garrett, 2009; Jones, 2014). For example, follow-
ing the death of Peter Connelly, a tabloid newspaper launched a petition to
sack all of the social workers involved, which was signed by 1.4 million
people in 2009 (Jones, 2014).
These developments provide powerful incentives for social workers to
engage in defensive practice as a means of protecting themselves (Cooper
et al., 2003; Ferguson, 2005). Although this process of practising defensively
can begin during students’ practice placements as part of their professional
training, there has been little focus on this within social work education.
This can leave students feeling that there is a gap between their practical
experiences on placement and their learning in the classroom (Preston-
Shoot, 2012).
There is a considerable literature on the wider social policy and organisa-
tional context that provides the backdrop to defensive practice. The 1990s
saw the introduction ofmore sophisticated systems of accountability, includ-
ing reviews, inspections, audits andmanagerial scrutiny, that served tomake
social work practice more defensive (Parton and O’Byrne, 2000; Munro,
2004). Ayre (2001) captures the emotional aspect of the drive towards
these new forms of accountability when he states that ‘The fear of missing
something vital encouragedpractice sodefensive that it seemed, at times, pri-
marily calculated to protect the system rather than the child’ (Ayre, 2001,
p. 897).
Although all areas of social work are affected, the high-profile nature of
child protection means that it is particularly pronounced in this field. This
is reflected in the academic literature, which has focused on the effects of
high-profile public inquiries predominantly in the field of child protection
(Cooper et al., 2003; Warner, 2014; Jones, 2014) and, to a lesser extent,
mental health (Warner, 2006; Laurence, 2003).
The issues are also relevant to adult social care; for example, the move
towards more person-centred support could provide tensions between user
choice and professional accountability.
These wider developments within social work have been contextualised as
akeyelementof the risk society,where safety is regardedas theprimaryvalue
(Beck, 1992; Stalker, 2003;Webb, 2006).Webb (2006) argues that the role of
social work has moved from a post-war welfare state conception of respond-
ing to ‘need’ to a neo-liberal role of responding to ‘risk’. Since the normative
basis of the risk society is safety, its utopia is essentially defensive and
negative (Beck, 1992). The impact of this move towards the risk society has
been a proclivity towards defensive and morally timid social work practice
(Stanford, 2010).
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Within British social work, defensive practice can be seen as an ‘open
secret’ because it has traditionally been discussed and acknowledged infor-
mally amongst practitioners andmanagers, but has rarely been discussed ex-
plicitly in the social work literature. The existing literature has focused upon
psychological and organisational factors that increase the likelihood of de-
fensive practice, rather than the nature of defensive practice itself. Psycho-
logical defences that underpin defensive practice have been written about,
particularly from a psychoanalytic perspective (Trevithick, 2011, 2014;
Lees et al., 2011;Whittaker, 2011). The organisational drivers that encourage
defensive practice have received some attention in theMunro reviewof child
protection, linked with the challenges of managing uncertainty:
. . . many of the problems in current practice seem to arise from the defensive
ways in which professionals are expected to manage that uncertainty. For
some, following rules and being compliant can appear less risky than carrying
the personal responsibility for exercising judgment (Munro, 2010, p. 6).
However, there is surprisingly littlewrittenexplicitly about thepractical real-
ities of defensive practice in social work. It is interesting to note that the only
journal article that focusesexclusivelyondefensivepracticewaswrittenbyan
academicphilosopher in the late1980sat theheightofa spateofpublic inquir-
ies.Harris (1987) argued that the concept has beenwidely debatedwithin the
medical profession in theUSA,provokedby increasing levelsofmedicalmal-
practice lawsuits. Whilst there is no direct equivalent legal threat for British
socialwork, theattacksonthe socialworkprofession in theUKhaveoccurred
not through courts of law, but rather through the ‘court of public opinion’
(Harris, 1987, p. 61).
In his article, Harris defines defensive practice as ‘practices which are de-
liberately chosen in order to protect the professional worker, at the possible
expenseof thewell-beingof the client’ (Harris, 1987, p. 62).However, he con-
cedes, since ‘best interests’ is always a personal judgement, so is defensive
practice. Harris (1987) argues that defensive practice refers to a range of be-
haviour, ranging from an overemphasis on documenting practice to either
intervening more than is needed (e.g. removing a child unnecessarily) or
refraining from intervening (e.g. not returning a child homewhen it is appro-
priate) in order to protect oneself against later being held responsible.
Methods
The study used three large focus groups involving a total of ninety final-year
students out of 119 students from two cohorts.Allwere invited to participate,
so the sample constitutes approximately three-quarters of the total cohorts.
The first two groups comprised the final-year cohort in one academic year
and the third was the total final-year student group in the following year.
All students, irrespective of cohort, had already completed an initial
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100-day placement andwere finishing their final-year placement. The ration-
ale for choosing final-year students was that they were likely to have had ex-
perience on placement that was relevant to defensive practice. Ethical
approval for the studywas obtained through the university ethics committee.
The three focus groups (n ¼ 23, 25 and 42) had a similar composition in
terms of gender and age. The gender profile was 80 per cent female and 20
per cent male. The age profile was 47 per cent were under thirty-five years
old, 50 per cent were between thirty-five and fifty years old, and 3 per cent
were over fifty years old. This profile was similar to the whole student
group, whichwas unsurprising given that the samplewas such a large propor-
tion of the total student cohort.
During the focus groups, participantswere givenan individualhandset that
enabled them to ‘vote’ anonymously to questions presented within a Power-
Point presentation without being aware of the views of other participants.
These responses were analysed immediately and presented to the partici-
pants in an aggregated format. Once participants had seen the results, this
led to focus group discussions that provided qualitative data in which partici-
pants explained the reasons for their choices and had the opportunity to
comment upon the overall results and the choices of others.
The study considered two main research questions. First, how did partici-
pants understand defensive practice and what were its main features?
Second, how did they rate specific vignettes? Consequently, the discussion
guide was in two sections. First, a more traditional qualitative approach
was used to explore students’ understanding of defensive practice, any mes-
sages that they may have received from colleagues or manager about defen-
sive practice, possible motivations for engaging in defensive practice and the
potential role of social work education.
In the second section, there was amore structured exercise where students
were presented with four vignettes providing real-life scenarios of potential
defensive practice and asked to rate them. The rating scale had five
options: ‘not defensivepractice’, ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ or ‘severedefensiveprac-
tice’ or ‘don’t know’. The four vignettes are presented in the ‘Findings’
section below. After students had voted anonymously, they were invited to
discuss the reasons for their choices in the focus group.
Quantitative data were inputted into SPSS and analysed using descriptive
and inferential statistics (t-tests, chi-square andCramer’sVstatistic).No stat-
istically significant differences were found between the three focus groups
and consequently quantitative data havebeen aggregated. Thematic analysis
was used to analyse the qualitative data and transcripts were coded using
NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software.
The research designwas chosen to enable each researchmethod to address
the traditional limitations of the other. For example, surveys provide a struc-
tured means of collecting quantifiable data about participants’ opinions, but
one of their main limitations is that there is no opportunity to explore
responses with participants. Surveys can incorporate real-life vignettes that
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cancontextualisebroadconceptsandmake themmore specific (Wilks, 2004).
Combining survey data with focus groups enables participants to provide
responses that can be quantifiable but which can be explored further
through open-ended discussion.
Focus groups provide an opportunity for participants to express a range of
opinions and challenge and interact with one another in an open environ-
ment. Participants can explore and develop their opinions through interac-
tions with others and this can provide insights into complex behaviours.
Group dynamics in focus groups can have positive and negative effects, inhi-
biting or encouraging the discussion of taboo topics (Kitzinger, 1994; Whit-
taker, 2012). The size of the focus groups was significantly larger than the
conventional size used for focus groups. The first groups contained twenty-
three and twenty-five participants, whilst the third contained forty-two
participants because of practical limitations. This was based upon previous
experience of using interactive software successfully with large groups.
However, a key limitation of focus groups, particularly larger groups, is
that they can inhibit the free and open discussion of difficult and sensitive
topics. Having such large groups meant that the nature of the discussions
was different to smaller groups; for example, it was more difficult for partici-
pants to make personal disclosures.
A similar limitation of focus groups is that dominantmembers can express
a view early and it can be difficult for other participants to publicly disagree.
In this respect, the use of a survey administered through interactive software
has two advantages. First, participants are not aware of the opinions of others
when theymake their choices so do so unencumbered by the views of others.
Second, the anonymous nature of ‘voting’ can make it easier for participants
to communicate views that they might otherwise have been reluctant to
express andwhichmight havebeen lost in traditional focus groupdiscussions.
Participants make their choice safe in the knowledge that they can choose
whether they explain it or not.
Findings
The findings aredivided into twoparts.The first part presents the focus group
discussions about the nature of defensive practice and why practitioners
might engage in such behaviour. The second part relates to the vignette exer-
cise and how students rated specific examples of defensive practice.
Part 1: Understanding the nature of defensive practice
In the first part of the focus groups, participants discussed defensive practice
ingeneral andwhypractitionersmightengage in it. Itbeginsbyexamining the
examples given by participants in relation to direct work with service users
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and more widely within the organisation. Then the underlying motivations
for defensive practice are explored by examining the wider organisational
and emotional contexts within which defensive behaviour took place.
The examples of defensive practice that participants described can be
divided between behaviour that related to direct work with service users
and those that related to working within the organisation. Defensive prac-
tice with service users referred to a range of behaviour, which included
avoiding challenging service users or even avoiding contact with service
users:
. . . it is about avoiding certain situations . . . avoiding getting involved in
certain pieces of work as a defensive mechanism. They might do things like
avoiding certain visits that they should go and attend to.Youknow, like arriv-
ing . . .what’s that term: The soft knock, using the sponge on the door, you
know? That sort of thing, and saying that the person wasn’t in so that you
don’t have to deal with the situation (Participant 4, Group 2).
Participants described howproviding orwithholding of services andworking
within legislation and policy could be used in a defensive way with service
users:
If you’ve got a child protection case that is going to court, defensivepractice is
about making sure that you offer some services. The chances of it working is
very slim but that doesn’t matter, you can prove to the court that you’ve
offered it (Participant 17, Group 1).
If you don’t get on with a service user, you could behave oppressively by not
offering them services but hide behind the law and policies to justify it (Par-
ticipant 37, Group 3).
Stickingoverly close toyour role andhidingbehind legislation—doingwhat is
lawful, not what is ethical (Participant 14, Group 1).
Defensive practice could include the overestimation of risk, because practi-
tioners and managers are aware that it is only the underestimation of risk
that will have negative consequences for them personally (Tuddenham,
2000):
Defensivepractice is about ‘maximising’ yourassessmentof risk’ (Participant
6, Group 2).
Iworkwithinpalliative care for older people, and serviceusers routinely have
to go into residential care becauseworkers andmanagerswant to cover them-
selves. They are covering themselves, minimising the risk because they don’t
want that level of risk on their watch (Participant 4, Group 1).
Aswell as workwith service users, defensive practice could relate toworking
within theorganisation.This can refer tobehaviour that is designed toprotect
the organisation as well as oneself:
Before we moved to a paperless system, I’ve had quite a few occasions of,
‘hide that file, there’s an audit coming up’. . .The evidence was that there
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was actually goodwork going on with the family but because some of the key
performance indicators maybe weren’t met or a particular assessment form
hadn’t been completed, the file would disappear (Participant 9, Group 2).
However, students perceived defensive behaviour within the organisation as
more commonly designed to protect the individual at the expense of others.
A central focus was the relationship between practitioners and managers,
particularly the sharing or avoiding of responsibility, not challenging man-
agers and avoiding supervision. Participants described behaviour that was
designed to share responsibility with managers for any decisions made:
Youalways have apaper trail.Alwaysmake sure, and copy inmanagerswhen
it is adecision thatyouneedso thatpeoplecansee thatyou’reasking for things
and then the responses youget, themanagers can seewhat’s happeningwith it
and you can protect yourself (Participant 19, Group 1).
To make your recommendation of what you think should be done and make
your manager aware of that so you’re kind of backing yourself up, ‘This is
what I thinkwe shoulddoand I’vebeenpersuaded todo somethingelse’ (Par-
ticipant 11, Group 2).
Share the responsibility with managers so if it doesn’t pan out successfully,
you’re also sharing the blame (Participant 31, Group 3).
Let themmake your decision. I’ve been told that. Let the manager make the
decision. If theymake thedecision then the baton fallswith them(Participant
7, Group 2).
The final quote is an example of upward delegation (Menzies Lyth, 1988;
Whittaker, 2011),where responsibility is not shared, but avoidedbydisown-
ing the decision. As well as sharing responsibility with managers, partici-
pants also described behaviour designed to share responsibility with other
professionals:
Where there are child protection concerns, I have been advised that if you
aren’t sure, then you have to call a conference. I think thatmost practitioners
probably call the conference to avoid being blamed. All professionals are
involved so itwon’tbenecessarilyyourdecision, theyareall involved (Partici-
pant 5, Group 2).
A frequently cited example of defensive practice within organisations was
recording any disagreements with managers:
I had discussions with management who directed me to take a particular
course of action that I didn’t agree with. Colleagues advised me to record it
in the case notes, so if it comes back, I have a record that I was directed to
do that (Participant 12, Group 3).
I havebeen told by colleagues andmanagers to covermyself, to be clear in the
recordings if I disagreed with any decision (Participant 18, Group 1).
Several participants cited avoiding supervision as a form of defensive prac-
tice. When this was explored, one participant said:
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You avoid supervision in order to avoid blame. Postponing your supervision
so that you won’t have to talk about anything that went wrong (Participant 9,
Group 2).
Another area of defensive practice within the organisation was not being
willing to challenge managers:
Defensive practice is about not challengingmanagement decisions and follow-
ing procedures in an unreflective and passive way (Participant 6, Group 1).
Avoiding challenging bad systems . . .. Avoiding challenging because there
are repercussions on you as an individual, because you’ll be distanced and
alienated from your colleagues (Participant 10, Group 2).
Iwas told that it is not alwaysworth arguingwithwhatever you see.Youknow
it’s not right, but it’s not worth it. It was a qualified social worker who toldme
that I’ve taken that on board. Social work is so incestuous so you can find that
you apply to somewhere and they’ve spoken to your manager so they have a
view of you before you even go to an interview (Participant 12, Group 1).
My manager told me about a colleague who argued with the management
about a service user and then he was out of a job. He’s not worked in nine
months and he has a mortgage to pay (Participant 22, Group 1).
The last two quotes identify clear messages from more experienced practi-
tioners about the dangers of challenging managers. The final quote can be
viewed as morally neutralising the duty to challenge bad practice through the
use of ‘atrocity stories’ (Dingwall, 1977), namely stories where the protagonist
bravely challenges those in authority, which leads to tragic outcomes for them.
Participants distinguished between active behaviour (sins of commission)
and passive behaviour (sins of omission). In the discussions, sins of commis-
sion (e.g. hiding the file before an inspection) were generally regarded as
more serious than sins of omission (e.g. avoiding supervision). One rationale
offered was that sins of commission weremore likely to be interpreted as de-
liberate,whilst sinsofomissioncouldbeexplainedaway inmorebenignways.
The examples given can be understood as a matrix (Table 1).
Table 1 Examples of defensive practice
With clients Within the organisation
Omission The ‘soft knock at the door’, hoping
that clients won’t answer
Avoiding expressing your professional opinion,
e.g. upward or sideways delegation
Not willing to challenge clients
Sticking overly close to your role
Avoiding supervision
Not willing to challenge managers
Commission Being overly cautious or overstating
when assessing risk
‘Hide the file’ during inspections Overemphasis
on case recording
Making highly qualified statements
when writing reports
‘Putting procedures before clients’
Being generally risk-averse ‘Doing what is lawful, not necessarily what is
ethical’
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Such amatrix can provide a useful framework for understanding themoral
understandingof defensivepracticeoutlinedby theparticipants. Participants
identified awide range of behaviours that could potentially serve a defensive
function. However, they recognised that many behaviours had positive
aspects, such as shared decision making with managers and other profes-
sionals, and practitionersmay not engage in such behaviour for purely or pri-
marily defensive reasons.
Defensive practice as ‘fear-based practice’: the influence of emotions
and organisational culture
Defensive practice is a form of fear-based practice—fear of what might
happen and the need to cover yourself just in case (Participant 19, Group 2).
Participants in both groups talked explicitly about fear, frequently expressed
as fear of being exposed and vilified in the press. As one participant stated:
‘It’s the fear of your face being splashed all over the papers’ (Participant
11, Group 1). The fear of a public inquiry or serious case review was rated
as the main reason why social workers engage in defensive practice by
twice as many people as the nearest alternative, which was disciplinary
action by employer (51 per cent compared to 24 per cent). Disapproval by
a manager was rated by only 9 per cent, fear of a service user complaint by
7 per cent and 9 per cent of participants chose ‘other’.
These discussions were often accompanied by laughter, which appeared to
express both anxiety at the catastrophic nature of this imagined scenario and
relief in being able to acknowledge the shared nature of their private fears.
Although there was some recognition that this scenario was highly unlikely,
participants were clear that the consequences of being involved in a public
inquiry could be devastating for the individual practitioner. As one partici-
pant stated: ‘Once you go into a public inquiry and something goes wrong,
that’s it. That’s the end of your career’ (Participant 7, Group 2).
In the discussions, some participants viewed defensive practice as a direct
product of a ‘culture of blame’, which requires practitioners to ‘cover their
backs and put the blame elsewhere’ (Participant 15, Group 2). In all three
groups, participants reported frequent messages from staff on their place-
ment that they should not leave themselves unprotected. For example, one
participant stated: ‘All the time, people tell you to cover your back’ (Partici-
pant 18,Group 3). Some participants expressed concerns that this can lead to
an organisational culture where defensive practice is so embedded that prac-
titioners are not consciously aware of this unless they consciously reflected
upon it:
You find yourself doing something and you’ll think suddenly, ‘Hold on a
minute. Why am I doing that?’ You’ve slid into the culture of your team . . .
so it’s critical to talk about it and think about how you’re going to work (Par-
ticipant 2, Group 2).
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This raises an interesting point about the nature of defensive practice.Whilst
Harris (1987) defines defensive practice as deliberate behaviour, this finding
suggested that it can be a subtler and less conscious process. Harris’s (1987)
definition of defensive practice excludes unintentional behaviour and it can
be argued that this is a logical distinction. However, this finding suggested
that viewing defensive practice as conscious and deliberately chosen behav-
iourdidnot capture the subtleandoftenunconsciousaspectsofmany real-life
situations.
In the discussions, participants saw a strong link between defensive prac-
tice and procedural adherence:
It’s aboutmaking sure that you are sticking to theprocedures carefully so that
there is no come back to you personally (Participant 3, Group 2).
It’s about risk avoidance; about making sure that you are sticking to proce-
dures carefully that there is no come back on you personally (Participant 2,
Group 2).
Putting procedures before clients (Participant 7, Group 1).
Another participant explicitly discussed the psychological function of
defensive practice as providing a sense of control in a situation of intense
uncertainty:
We work in such anxious settings and the uncertainty is so great, that some-
times working defensively is the only control that you may have, In an area
where there is such a lot of risk and uncertainty, you might want to stick to
the procedures just to feel safe (Participant 11, Group 2).
This study was designed to examine defensive practice across social work
rather than focusing upon a specific context, but the high profile that is
given to child protection means that this setting is strongly represented
both in the literature and in the data. It was interesting to note that partici-
pants provided examples of defensive practice across awide range of settings
but themost extreme fears related to a public inquiry, which in theUK relate
mainly to child protection or mental health.
Part 2: The vignettes
In the second part of the focus groups, participants were presented with four
vignettes of behaviour thatmight be considered defensive practice and asked
to rate them according to five options: whether they thought that it wasmild,
moderate or severe defensive practice, don’t know or not defensive practice
at all (Table 2).
The four scenarios abovewere designed to represent awide range of beha-
viours that were deliberately designed to portray examples of increasingly
severe defensive practice.
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Discussion
Whilstageneral consensusabout thenatureandmotivation fordefensiveprac-
tice was expressed in the first part of the focus group, there was little clear
agreement when rating vignettes. The preliminary hypothesis for the study
was that therewouldbeabroaddegreeofconsensusaboutwhereeachscenario
would be placed along a continuum of severity and this consensus would
become increasingly clear as the vignettes became more severe. This hypoth-
esis was only partially supported. The rating of ‘severe defensive practice’
increased from 25 per cent to 67 per cent in a smooth progression, which was
expected. However, the rating of ‘not defensive practice at all’ was erratic,
rising from7per cent to29per cent, 24per centand14per cent so the increased
senseof agreement thatweanticipateddidnotmaterialise. Indeed, therewas a
pattern in which participants’ responses appeared to become polarised into
extremes as the scenarios becamemore serious and the discussion developed.
Participants had a four-point scale for rating behaviour, ranging from not
defensive to severedefensivepractice.When the first scenariowaspresented,
almosthalf of theparticipants chose themiddle responseof ‘moderate’defen-
sive practice and very few tried to argue that it was not defensive practice
(7 per cent). As the discussion developed, the voting became more and
Table 2 The vignettes
Vignette Is it defensive practice?
Voting
(n ¼ 90)
Vignette 1—A is anxious about making the right deci-
sionabouta serviceuserbecause it involves somerisk.
She believes that this risk is warranted, but is con-
cerned about leaving herself vulnerable if it goes
wrong. In supervisionwithhermanager, shedoesnot
disclose her opinion and manoeuvres her manager
into making the decision
Not defensive practice 7%
Mild defensive practice 10%
Moderate defensive practice 48%
Severe defensive practice 25%
Don’t know 11%
Vignette2—Inasupervisionsession,Bdescribesa service
user whomhe thinks is at risk. His manager disagrees
and tells him that he should be working to close the
case. After the session, B records the difference of
opinion in the case notes
Not defensive practice 29%
Mild defensive practice 20%
Moderate defensive practice 16%
Severe defensive practice 33%
Don’t know 2%
Vignette 3—Social worker Y is meticulous about fol-
lowingcorrectproceduresandgetting it right,buthis
colleagues worry that it is at the expense of service
users
Not defensive practice 24%
Mild defensive practice 10%
Moderate defensive practice 13%
Severe defensive practice 39%
Don’t know 14%
Vignette 4—Socialworker Z is onahomevisit to a family
who has complained to the Health and Care Profes-
sional Council (Professional regulatory body) about
the previous social worker. When a senior family
member says something that the socialworkerknows
is untrue, she does not challenge because she is con-
cerned that they will complain about her
Not defensive practice 14%
Mild defensive practice 2%
Moderate defensive practice 10%
Severe defensive practice 67%
Don’t know 7%
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more polarised between the two extreme options of ‘severe defensive prac-
tice’ and ‘not defensive practice at all’. In the three final scenarios, the two
responses were the most commonly and participants choosing the middle
group became increasingly rare. Participants who rated behaviour as
‘mild defensive practice’ (range: 2–20 per cent across the scenarios) were a
small minority—smaller than the ‘don’t know’ group in three out of the
four scenarios.
This pattern became more pronounced as the discussion developed and
was most clearly shown in the final vignette (not challenging a service user
for fear of a complaint), which was designed to present the strongest
example of defensive practice. Opinions were polarised into extremes, with
the two most frequent ratings being ‘severe defensive practice’ (67 per
cent) or ‘not defensive practice’ (14 per cent). When asked to discuss the
reasons for their choices, participants increasingly sought to justify the
actions of the social worker in the scenario (Table 3).
We are not arguing that such accounts are simply justifications for defen-
sive practice. Some of them made good points that demonstrated the com-
plexities around defining defensive practice. What we are arguing is that
participants’ efforts to defend the practitioner’s actions in the vignettes
became more vigorous as the discussion developed, whilst others became
more condemnatory.
Participants founddiscussing their choicesmoredifficult as the focusgroup
proceeded. For example, when the fourth vignettewas discussed in one focus
group, a participant expressed incredulity that others had rated it as ‘not de-
fensive practice’. Participants who had chosen this response did not express a
view about why they had made their choice, despite direct prompts to do so.
One likely explanation is that participants felt that it was difficult to do so in a
large group setting and did not wish to experience censure from others.
Such polarised views were difficult to comprehend at first without refer-
ence to the focus group discussions afterwards and demonstrated the
strengths of combining quantitative and qualitative data. There are a
number of potential explanations for this pattern. One explanation is that
participants were simply confused about how to evaluate each example
given the lack of time for reflection and the moral complexities of the vign-
ettes. It is possible that participants may have given different responses if
Table 3 Rationales given for vignette rating
Vignette Rationale offered
Vignette 3: Social worker is meticulous
about records
‘. . . that person is naturally meticulous’ (Participant 17,
Group 3)
Vignette 4: Social worker does not chal-
lenge for fear of complaint
‘. . . you might not want to cause a row . . . the family might
have a history of aggression or anything’ (Participant 37,
Group 3)
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they had been given the vignettes in advance and had time to formulate a
more considered response. It is likely that at least some of the variation can
be explained by some participants judging behaviour by the intentions of
the social actor whilst others make judgements based upon its likely conse-
quences. Whilst this viewpoint would account for the comparatively low
levels of agreement between participants, it has greater difficulty in explain-
ing this pattern of polarisation that became more pronounced as the discus-
sion developed.
An alternative explanation is that participants were influenced by peer
pressures to conform to group norms. However, the high levels of disagree-
ment obtained through anonymous voting made it difficult for participants
to gaina sense that therewere agreedgroupnorms to conform to. In addition,
the increasing level of disagreement as the exercise progressedwould suggest
against group conformity as a possible explanation.
Athirdexplanation is that thispolarisationofviews itself serves adefensive
function at a psychological level. This viewpoint starts with the premise that
participants viewed themselves as ethically soundpractitioners and therefore
find it uncomfortable to think of themselves as engaging in dubious and
undesirable practices. Given the emphasis on social work values in social
work training courses, this does not seem an unreasonable assumption,
though it may not be true in all cases. The second premise is that, when parti-
cipants are faced with a concrete scenario, they ask themselves: ‘Would I
engage in that behaviour?’ The data from the focus groups, in which partici-
pants frequently described scenarios in highly personal ways, provide some
support for this premise. Inboth focus groups, thediscussions after each scen-
ario suggest that participantswere consideringwhether theywould personal-
ly engage in the stated behaviour in the situation described. One participant
stated:
My take is how do I decide?Would I do that? If ‘yes’, it’s not that bad and if I
wouldn’t it is really bad (Participant 22, Group 3).
From this perspective, participants faced with a specific scenario have two
choices.First, if theycouldnot imagine themselvesengaging in thebehaviour,
they are able to distance themselves from the behaviour by viewing it as
severe or moderate defensive practice. Second, if they considered that they
might engage in the behaviour described, they are then presented with a
dilemma. Given that they view themselves as ethically sound practitioners,
it would be uncomfortable for participants to thinkof themselves as engaging
in dubious and undesirable practices. In this situation, redefining the behav-
iour as ‘not defensive practice’ is a means of neutralising the ethical threat.
For example, in the scenario where a social worker manoeuvred her
manager intomaking a decision, participants who rated this as ‘not defensive
practice’ stated that she was been ‘very creative’, her behaviour had ‘intelli-
gence’ and ‘as a social worker, we should use our resources and shewas using
hermanager as a resource’.Given thesepositive definitions, practitioners are
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able to engage in the behaviour without the discomfort of feeling ethically
compromised.
The lack of consensus supports the key point made by Harris (1987) that
defensive practice is a subjective judgement. The commentsmade by partici-
pants emphasised how the language of risk hasmoved into everyday practice
inways that encouragepractitioners tomanage the risk to themselves and the
organisation, not just to service users (Ayre, 2001; Webb, 2006; Stanford,
2010). This involves mechanisms such as the defensive use of procedures
(Munro, 2010) and upward delegation tomanagers to share or avoid respon-
sibility (Whittaker, 2011).
Therewere several limitationswith this research design.Having such large
groupsmeant that the nature of the discussionswas different tomuch smaller
focus groups; for example, it was more difficult for participants to make per-
sonal disclosures. When participants explained their choices, they did so
within a focus group where participants may disagree with their views.
However, the candid nature of the comments that many participants made
suggests that this influence was not overwhelming. It also gives supports to
the view that defensive practice is an ‘open secret’, which is rarely acknowl-
edged in the literature and policy documents, but is well known to practi-
tioners and managers. The anonymous nature of voting means that
participants may provide responses that are closer to their real views, but
they may be reluctant to explain these within a large focus group. One of
the limitations of both surveys and focus groups is that people may state
how theywould act butmayact differently in real life.This, however, is a limi-
tation that is shared with alternative research methods, such as individual
interviews (Bryman, 2012).
Conclusions and implications
The study found that therewasageneral consensusabout thenatureofdefen-
sive practice. Whilst the literature identifies defensive practice as deliberate
behaviour, the focus group discussions suggest that it is a subtler and less con-
scious process. Rather than being a deliberate process, they described it as
‘part of the culture’ of the agency or something they picked up from other
practitioners without questioning.
Participants used twomaindistinctions that related to the forms thatdefen-
sive practice took and the underlying motives that encouraged such behav-
iour. First, they distinguished between behaviour that related to direct
work with service users, such as overestimating risk, avoiding contact; and
those that related toworkingwithin the organisation, such as avoiding super-
vision,upwarddelegation.Second, theydistinguishedbetweenpro-activebe-
haviour (sins of commission) and passive behaviour (sins of omission).
Passive behaviour was generally regarded as less serious than pro-active
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behaviour, because itwas less tangible andeasier toattribute tomorepositive
motives.
However, there was considerable disagreement when participants were
asked to rate specific vignettes. There was also a consistent pattern of
increased polarisation across the scenarios, in which participants rated be-
haviour on either ends of the spectrum. Several competing explanations
were explored, including thepossibility that suchpolarisation servedas apsy-
chological defence in itself.
There was strong support within the focus groups for teaching input on de-
fensive practice within the curriculum. During the focus groups, participants
described the discussions as thought-provoking and found themselves exam-
ining their own practice, frequently concluding that it was more defensive
than they had realised. Therefore, any approach to teaching about defensive
practice requires us to understand the issues that students are strugglingwith.
Initially, participants appearedquiteopenaboutdiscussingdefensiveprac-
tice in an educational setting where everyone was willing to acknowledge it
quite openly.However, the polarising dynamicmeant that it became increas-
ingly difficult for participants to explain their choices. This presents chal-
lenges for social work education, not the least of which is whether and how
we should talk about it in the classroom.Whilst there is a general assumption
that it is alwaysgood to talkaboutdifficult subjects in theclassroom, this isnot
so simple with defensive practice.
As well as the issues about group dynamics discussed above, talking about
defensive practice in the classroomposes uswith an uncomfortable dilemma.
If we take the position of condemning defensive practice, we risk alienating
students whomay regard us as being out of touch with the real world of prac-
tice. If we regard it as understandable, then we risk colluding with unaccept-
ablepractice.Consequently, it isunsurprising thata tacit silencehasgenerally
operated and defensive practice has become an open secret—everybody
knows about it but nobody talks about it. The problem with this silence is
that a gap opens up between what people say and do. Argyris and Scho¨n
(1974) articulate this dichotomy, which they describe as the gap between
the theories that underpin what people say they do (‘espoused theories’)
and the theories that underpin what they actually do (‘theories in use’).
In the discussions, what appeared to be sacrificed is amiddle groundwhere
behaviour could be regarded as imperfect but ‘good enough’. As educators,
our challenge is how we can create space for this middle ground and
develop an ethically nuanced perspective rather than retreating behind the
comfort of entrenched positions. For example, the lack of consensus on
what specific behaviours constitute defensive practice may indicate that
this is an unhelpful way of viewing the phenomenon. Being able to categoric-
ally state whether specific behaviour is defensive or not is attractive.
However, it risks reifying behaviour in overly simplistic ways that do not
take sufficient account of the contexts of motivation, relationships and
organisational cultures. Above all, we need to develop a greater depth of
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understandingof defensivepracticeourselvesbeforeweareable to teach it to
our students, otherwise what we conveymay only be our own sense of confu-
sion and uncertainty.
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